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This box describes the most notable features of the 
update to the Banco de España’s macroeconomic 
projections for the Spanish economy published on 7 June 
2019.1 In particular, the present projections take on board 
the changes to the technical assumptions arising from the 
new information that became available between the two 
exercises (see Table 1)2 and the latest National Accounts 
data. The latter include a revision made by the National 
Statistics Institute (INE) to the time series for the period 
1995-2018 and, also, preliminary results for the quarterly 
time series up to 2019 Q2 (see Box 8). This recent revision 
of the National Accounts time series means that it is 
particularly hard to make comparisons with the June 
projections.3
The present projections point to continuation of the 
Spanish economy’s expansionary phase over the period 
2019‑2021 (see Table  2). Growth will continue to be 
underpinned by the accommodative stance of monetary 
policy, reinforced by the measures adopted by the 
Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) at 
its last meeting, the favourable financial position of firms 
and households on aggregate (although some groups of 
agents are still in a comparatively vulnerable situation), 
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1  Macroeconomic	projections	for	the	Spanish	economy	(2019-2021):	the	Banco	de	España’s	contribution	to	the	Eurosystem’s	June	
2019 joint forecasting exercise.
2	 	The	June	2019	projections	were	based	on	the	information	available	as	at	15	May	for	those	variables	that	have	a	bearing	on	the	
projections.	In	the	latest	exercise	the	cut-off	was	17	September,	except	for	data	on	export	markets	and	the	prices	of	competitors	in	
their	national	currencies,	which	were	taken	from	the	ECB	staff	macroeconomic	projections	for	the	euro	area,	September	2019,	which	
use information up to 19 August. 
3	 	A	further	difficulty	is	that	sector	accounts	consistent	with	the	annual	National	Accounts	and	the	preliminary	quarterly	results	have	still	
not been published.
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Cut-off date for assumptions: 17 September 2019. Figures expressed as levels are annual averages. Figures expressed as rates are calculated 
based on the relevant annual averages.
b Differences between rates for world output and export markets and between levels for oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate. Percentage 
differences for the effective nominal exchange rate and percentage point differences for interest rates.
c A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
d For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared using the Eurosystem's methodology. These assumptions 
are based on futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these 
variables.
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INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rates of change unless otherwise indicated
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and the assumption that, following their recent weakness, 
export markets will tend to recover gradually over the 
projection horizon. As a result of all this, it is expected that 
the growth rate of the economy will continue to enable the 
still high volume of unemployment to be reabsorbed.
Notwithstanding this, activity will tend to become less 
buoyant over the projection horizon. In terms of average 
annual rates, after growing by 2.4% in 2018, GDP is 
projected to grow by 2% in 2019, and by 1.7% in 2020 
and 1.6% in 2021. This profile of deceleration is partly a 
result of weaker domestic demand, revealed by the latest 
National Accounts data, and partly a consequence of the 
latest economic data available, which point to a weakening 
of activity over the summer months. Overall, this new 
information shows that the deterioration of the external 
environment and the uncertainties originating from the 
rest of the world (and possibly also other domestic ones) 
appear to be having a moderating impact on business 
and household spending. This context of greater 
uncertainty is expected to continue to weigh on agents’ 
spending decisions, particularly in the short term, leading 
to more moderate activity growth than in recent years.
Notable, in comparison with the June projections, are the 
significant changes made to three of the assumptions on 
which the projections are based. First, the expected 
dynamism of Spain’s export markets is now less than it 
was three months ago, especially in 2019 and 2020, as a 
result of the lower growth projected for the euro area and, 
especially, for the economies outside the euro area (see 
Table 1). The cumulative growth of external markets over 
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SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
Latest QNA figure published: 2019 Q2.
a Projections cut-off date: 17 September 2019.
b Includes machinery, capital goods, weapons systems, cultivated biological resources and intellectual property products.
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PROJECTIONS FOR THE MAIN MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a) 
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
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the whole of the time horizon considered has been revised 
downwards by 1.4 pp. Compared with the negative impact 
on activity that this change gives rise to, the other two 
changes work in the opposite direction. In particular, there 
has been a notable downward revision to the oil price, 
which boosts the growth of private agents’ real incomes. 
Also, the paths of interbank market interest rates and 
government debt yields are now considerably below 
those anticipated three months ago, which results in lower 
financing costs for the economy as a whole. This revision 
to the interest rates expected by the financial markets is 
explained by two main factors: the latest euro area activity 
and inflation data (which is less favourable than was 
anticipated three months ago); and the loosening of 
monetary policy in the United States and the new 
monetary stimulus measures adopted by the Governing 
Council of the ECB on 12 September.4
The changes in the fiscal policy assumptions for the 
projection horizon, relative to the June projections 
exercise, are of little significance. As in June, the fiscal 
policy forecasts incorporate the extension to 2019 of the 
2018 State and Social Security budgets, the measures 
approved by parliament before the April general elections,5 
the regional government and local government budgets 
approved for 2019, as well as the information available on 
the budget outturn. As regards the assumptions for the 
rest of the time horizon considered, the upcoming general 
elections make it practically impossible for the draft 
budget for 2020 to be presented in 2019. Also, as at the 
cut-off date for the projections, the new National Accounts 
time series for general government, to be published on 30 
September, were still not available. Accordingly, the 
projections take as their starting point the previously 
released 2018 data.
Against this background, when projecting the expected 
paths of certain budgetary items over the period 
2020-2021, certain technical assumptions have been 
made, as in the June projections. First, that the items 
subject to greater discretion, including notably, on account 
of their size, purchases of goods and services and public 
investment, will grow in line with the Spanish economy’s 
potential growth rate. Second, it is considered that the 
paths of the other items, making up the general 
government accounts will be determined, in the absence 
of additional measures, by their usual determinants. 
Specifically, it is assumed that public revenues will grow in 
line with the tax bases, which basically depend on the 
macroeconomic context. Similar assumptions have been 
made for less discretionary spending items, including 
spending on pensions (which is determined, along with 
the increases agreed for 2018-2019, by the revaluation 
formula established by law and by population ageing), 
unemployment benefits (the growth of which will depend 
basically on developments in unemployment) and interest 
(changes in which reflect the growth of government debt 
and the course of interest rates). This last item, in 
particular, has been revised down on account of the 
changes observed in market interest rates compared with 
the previous projections. In accordance with these 
assumptions, the fiscal policy stance will be expansionary 
in 2019, and approximately neutral over the following two 
years.6
The changes to the assumptions on which the projections 
are based have, overall, a neutral impact on GDP growth 
over the projection horizon. Specifically, the negative 
impact of the deterioration in external markets on activity 
is offset by the positive effect of lower financing costs and 
lower oil prices. Notwithstanding this, the information that 
has become available since June has led to a downward 
revision in the GDP growth rates projected over the 
projection horizon, in comparison with those published in 
June. This is a consequence of two types of factors. First, 
the revised National Accounts time series indicate that the 
Spanish economy’s resilience to the context of global 
uncertainty which began to gradually take hold last year is 
actually lower than estimated three months ago. Indeed, 
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4  See Section 3.2 of the main text for a detailed description of these measures.
5	 	Among	these	measures,	which	were	already	included	in	the	March	and	June	projections,	the	following	are	notable	for	the	size	of	
their	impact	on	spending:	(i) the	increase	in	pensions	in	2019	in	line	with	CPI	forecasts;	(ii) the	increase	in	public	sector	wages;	(iii) the	
progressive	extension	of	paternity	leave	to	8	weeks	this	year,	12	weeks	in	2020	and	16	weeks	in	2021;	and	(iv) the	reintroduction	of	
the	unemployment	benefits	for	the	over-52s.	As	regards	revenues,	the	projections	include	the	increases	in	the	minimum	(due	to	the	
increase	in	the	national	minimum	wage)	and	maximum	contribution	bases	(by	7%),	as	well	as	in	the	rates	for	self-employed	workers.
6	 	In	2018	and	in	2019,	a	number	of	temporary	measures	are	budgeted	(such	as	the	costs	of	the	insolvent	toll	motorways,	the	asset	
protection	schemes	and	deferred	fiscal	assets	of	banks,	and	the	judgement	on	the	exemption	of	maternity	and	paternity	benefits	
from	personal	income	tax),	with	a	rising	impact	on	the	budget	deficit	of	0.4%	and	0.3%	of	GDP,	respectively.
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the new data show a profile of slowing activity (and, in 
particular, of slowing domestic demand) that is more 
pronounced than the one according to the previous time 
series. Second, the increase in global uncertainty over the 
summer months and the deterioration of the external 
setting (the recovery in which is expected to be postponed 
by several quarters) led to a downward revision to the 
growth anticipated in the second half of the year and, 
more modestly, over the rest of the forecast. As a result of 
all this, the GDP growth projected for 2019 has been 
revised down by 0.4 pp, the revision of National Accounts 
data and the less favourable economic developments 
since the spring and their effects on the short-term outlook 
having made contributions of approximately the same 
magnitude to this revision. The downward revisions in 
2020 and 2021 are of 0.2 pp and 0.1 pp, respectively. 
The projected GDP growth path is underpinned by a lower 
positive contribution of domestic demand than in the 
recent past. The rate of growth of the main domestic 
demand components has also been revised down, largely 
because it has eased recently. Thus, the more recent data 
reflect a slowdown in spending on consumer goods and 
services. This loss of dynamism may be connected to the 
heightened uncertainty. Going forward, growth in 
consumption is expected to be underpinned by labour 
market developments, which are expected to remain 
positive (despite feeling the impact of the recent 
slowdown), and by continuing favourable financing 
conditions. Private consumption growth has been revised 
down compared with the June projections. This is the 
result of the inclusion of the more recent information, not 
only on the new historical series but also on the recent 
less expansionary labour market performance. 
As regards the components of gross fixed capital 
formation, over the course of the projection horizon both 
residential and business investment are expected to be 
less dynamic than in recent years, against a backdrop of 
greater uncertainty, lower new plant capacity requirements 
and more moderate growth in the real estate market after 
years of recovery. In annual average terms, over the 3-year 
projection horizon analysed, both aggregates will record 
lower growth than forecast in June. The downward 
revision is especially marked for 2019 and is largely the 
result of the inclusion of the data on the latest quarters 
recently released by the INE. 
The average growth projection for exports in 2019 has 
been revised up. This is due to the inclusion of the new 
data series since, conversely, the heightened uncertainty 
and the weaker performance expected of the export 
markets suggest that in coming quarters sales abroad will 
be less robust than forecast three months ago. This 
deterioration in the external environment explains why 
export growth expectations have been revised down in 
the rest of the projection horizon. Import growth 
expectations over the projection horizon are also lower 
now than in June. This reflects both the import 
sluggishness observed in the latest quarters and the lower 
final demand momentum expected going forward.
The slower GDP growth forecast over the projection 
horizon will translate into a gradual decline in the pace of 
job creation, as has already been observed in the most 
recent employment indicators. In any event, the increase 
in employment will mean that the unemployment rate will 
continue to decline, although less markedly than expected 
in June. This is also a reflection of higher growth in the 
labour force owing to the higher population dynamism 
projected, which is in turn a consequence of the inclusion 
of the most recent information on net migration (see 
Box 5). The unemployment rate is now expected to fall to 
12.8% at the end of the projection horizon, 1 pp above the 
level forecast three months ago.
Inflation, measured as the year-on-year rate of change of 
the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP), is 
expected to rise over the projection horizon. This is a 
consequence of the decrease in the cyclical slack in the 
labour market, as a result of the continued economic 
expansion, which will drive up unit labour costs. The 
expansionary monetary policy stance will also contribute 
in the same direction. By contrast, the assumptions on 
which the projection exercise is based suggest that 
external inflationary pressure will decline in coming years, 
reflecting the downward path of oil prices. As a result of 
these combined effects, in annual average terms HICP 
growth is expected to rise gradually, from 0.8% in 2019 to 
1.5% in 2021. For its part, the rate of growth of core 
inflation – measured as the rate of change of the HICP 
excluding energy and food – will rise over the projection 
horizon, from 1.1% in 2019 to 1.6% in 2021. 
With all due caution, considering that budget deficit series 
consistent with the new national accounts series are not 
yet available, it is estimated that the general government 
budget balance in 2019 could be -2.4% of GDP. This would 
imply maintaining the deficit forecast for 2019 compared 
with the June projections, as it is estimated that the 
negative impact of the cyclical deterioration on public 
finances will be offset by the positive effect of lower 
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interest rates, together with the additional effects deriving 
from certain non-recurring items and from the better than 
expected performance of some tax revenues.
The current HICP growth projections entail a downward 
revision of 0.3 pp in 2019 and 0.2 pp in 2020. Part of the 
reason for this is that, in the more recent months, energy 
prices and, to a lesser extent, prices of other goods have 
been less dynamic than expected in the previous 
projection exercise. Moreover, the levels projected for 
crude prices are now lower and the growth forecast for 
non-energy prices is more contained. The forecasts for 
2021 remain unchanged, as a result of two contrasting 
effects. On the one hand, the fall in crude prices expected 
in the futures markets has eased compared with that 
considered in the projection exercise three months ago. 
On the other hand, as in all the other years in the 
projection horizon, core inflation has been revised down 
by 1  pp owing to weaker demand and more moderate 
inflation expectations.
The risks to the central scenario for growth in activity 
remain on the downside. On the external front, as 
indicated, the near-term growth outlook for Spain’s 
export markets has been revised down, in accordance 
with the recent data on activity worldwide (and in 
particular in the euro area which is Spain’s main trading 
partner). The assumptions on future export market 
behaviour – taken from the latest ECB staff projections – 
assume that the recent adverse performance is temporary 
and that it will start to reverse in early 2020. However, if 
the recent weakening of activity proves to be more 
persistent than envisaged in the assumptions, the course 
of the Spanish economy would be less favourable than 
envisaged in the central scenario. Other sources of 
uncertainty are the possible adoption of new protectionist 
measures and the question marks over the form that 
Brexit will take. Lastly, the recent spike in oil prices 
following the attacks on Saudi production facilities is a 
reminder that latent geopolitical tensions can give rise to 
reductions in the oil supply, with the consequent negative 
impact on activity. On the domestic front, there is still a 
high degree of uncertainty over the future economic 
policy stance and the adoption of measures that will 
increase the resilience of the Spanish economy to a 
possible deterioration of the global macro-financial 
environment and boost its potential growth. In particular, 
there are few details on fiscal policy, in a setting in which 
the persistently high levels of government debt mean that 
Spanish public finances still have pockets of vulnerability 
to possible adverse shocks.
The risks of inflation departing from the central scenario 
are also on the downside, as a consequence of the 
hypothetical materialisation of the risks to activity 
described above. However, some of these risks also 
contain potential inflationary elements. For instance 
higher tariffs, which imply higher import prices at the 
different stages of the value chain and, therefore, could 
have an indirect effect on the prices of purchases made 
by the Spanish economy abroad, and also hypothetical 
oil price rises as a consequence of an increase in certain 
geopolitical tensions.
